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Abstract: In the wake of hurricane Katrina, a controversy erupted in the media about the use of the word ‘refugee’ to describe those who had been displaced by the disaster. While some contended that the term was the only one able to convey the plight of the victims, others argued that it was racially biased and inappropriate. The people who had been displaced themselves unanimously rebutted the use of the word, and insisted on being called ‘evacuees’ or ‘survivors’. I argue that the reason for this controversy were the social vulnerabilities that had been revealed and exposed by hurricane Katrina, that seemed encompassed in the word ‘refugee’. Furthermore, this controversy also sheds new light on the questioning about the definition and typology of environmental migration, and invites to integrate the perceptions of the victims themselves in the debates surrounding the words that are supposed to name them. This paper is based on a four-month field study in New Orleans, from December 2006 until March 2007.
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INTRODUCTION: A SOCIAL DISASTER IN NEW ORLEANS
Abundant literature on disasters has shown that a natural hazard does not always result in a disaster, but only when the hazard hits in a context of social vulnerability (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002).  The case of hurricane Katrina provides an example particularly telling of this interaction between natural hazards and social vulnerabilities. Before Katrina hit, the economic situation of New Orleans was dire already: the oil and gas industry had relocated to Texas, and economic opportunities, apart from tourism, were scarce. Louisiana was one of the poorest states in the United States, and 28 per cent of New Orleans’ population lived below the poverty line. Amongst those, 84 per cent were African Americans. One quarter of the population did not own a car, and many had never left the city. 
The city itself had grown out of the historical French Quarter alongside the banks of Mississippi, in a disorganized and anarchic fashion: as the population expanded, levees were built and flood-prone neighbourhoods were developed (Colten 2004). Many experts had warned of the risks faced by the city in the case of a hurricane: the had pointed the geographical location of the city, under sea-level and nested between the Gulf of Mexico, the Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River, but also the degradation of the wetlands, the fragile and poorly maintained levees, or the alarming state of the pumps. They were not heard, and sometimes not even listened to (van Heerden and Bryan 2006). 
Though the disaster brought devastation to the whole city, some neighbourhoods were more affected than other, and some segments of the population were more affected than others. These segments were those with the highest rate of social vulnerability, which could not be reduced to the sole criterion of poverty. Laska and Hearn Morrow have shown that those most affected by the disasters were poor, black, female, old, renters and in poor medical condition (Laska and Hearn Morrow 2006). Most of the time, these factors cumulated to each other, amounting in a high rate of social vulnerability, far higher than the national American average.
Such inequalities in the face of the hurricane were revealed and exposed during the evacuation: most of those who did not evacuate and were stranded in the flooded city belonged to the categories above-mentioned. These inequalities were not only exposed during the evacuation, but also during the resettlement process and the rebuilding of the city; in this paper however, I shall restrict my analysis to the evacuation patterns and the hurricane’s immediate aftermath. I will expose the role played by social vulnerabilities in the evacuation pattern, and then look at the way the evacuation and the evacuees were characterised by the media, through the lens of the ‘refugee controversy’. I shall finally analyse how the controversy relates to the revealing of these vulnerabilities and inequalities, and try to draw some lessons for the current debates on the characterisation and definition of environmental migrants.
THE EVACUATION: A SOCIOLOGY OF THOSE LEFT BEHIND
The evacuation of the Gulf Coast was the largest internal displacement ever experienced in the United States: an estimated 1,200,000 people fled the Greater New Orleans area in a couple of days, a displacement whose magnitude was often compared to the Dust Bowl migration (Grier 2005). Interestingly, both events were induced, at least partly, by environmental changes. 
The evacuation plans of local authorities drew much criticism from commentators and scholars alike (Shughart II 2006; Brinkley 2006). Shughart recalls that

Despite the alarms being sounded by LSU’s​[1]​ storm-trackers and a personal telephone call on Saturday from the director of the National Hurricane Center warning him of the seriousness of the threat New Orleans faced, Mayor C. Ray Nagin did not issue an order to evacuate the city until Katrina was within 48 hr of making landfall and did not make evacuation mandatory until late Sunday morning, when fewer than 24 hr remained (2006: 37).

The Governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, was also widely accused of being too slow to react, and deferred much of its power to Mayor Nagin when it came to the evacuation. In the final report of the committee set up by the House of Representatives to investigate the government failures before and after hurricane Katrina, it is noted that:

Despite warning 56 hours before landfall, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed ordering a mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall. (…) The failure to order timely mandatory evacuations, Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the remaining population, and decisions of individuals led an incomplete evacuation. (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 2006: 2)

This criticism, however, has to be nuanced. Most of the respondents I interviewed were mostly critical of the federal administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in particular, while many of them praised local authorities for the way the evacuation was handled. Even though this observation has no statistical value, I observed that poorest respondents had a stronger tendency to blame the federal administration, and that the judgement on the administration was – unsurprisingly – strongly correlated with the experience of the evacuation: an horrendous experience was more likely to be associated with criticism towards the administration. 
The two stories of the evacuation
As Kiefer and Montjoy observed, there are actually two stories of the evacuation (2006: 122). The first one is the relative success of the traffic flow management for those who evacuated by themselves – the vast majority of the population. This success was achieved in large parts thanks to a contraflow system that was implemented on the I-10 motorway​[2]​. The contraflow allowed motorists to use both sides of the motorway, thus reducing considerably the potential traffic jams, even though several respondents mentioned that it had taken them more than ten hours to drive to Baton Rouge during the evacuation, instead of the usual one hour and a half. Boyd also notes that more than one million moved out of harms within 48 hours, a number far above the 65 pc exit capacity of the city. This number represented 90 pc of the population at risk, but only 65 pc of those who didn’ t own a car (carless population) (Boyd 2006). 

The other story of the evacuation is the one that drew most attention: around 15 pc of the population of New Orleans, representing about 10 pc of the population at risk, did not evacuate, because she was unable to do so and chose not to. Boyd further asserts that about 110,000 people rode out the storm at home or in a friend or relative’s house, including 70,000 in New Orleans (2006).

These people were gathered the Superdome football stadium, which had previously been identified as a refuge for the stranded population. As the Superdome exceeded its capacity, inhabitants moved into the Convention Center, where similar facilities had not been installed. Some stranded residents were also directly evacuated by the federal, state and local agencies, as well as local volunteers. Coast Guards were credited with 33,000 rescues, and Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries with 22,000 rescues (Boyd 2006). 

These two stories resulted in a strange paradox: though the evacuation of the city overall was a relative success, it is the incompleteness of the evacuation, abundantly shown in he media,  that triggered the public uproar on the management of the disaster. The evacuation rate was far above the most optimistic predictions of evacuation planning experts (van Heerden and Bryan 2006), but the fact that about 70,000 individuals remained stranded in the city in appalling conditions was the focus on the most vehement criticism on the disaster management. I argue that the reason for this reason was that the evacuation was racially and socially stratified, exposing massive inequalities in vulnerability. These inequalities had been grossly neglected, and this negligence was perceived as racism. In the abovementioned survey conducted for the Wahington Post by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University, 68 pc of the respondents claimed race and poverty had impacted on the speed of the rescue efforts ("Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees"  2005), even though the official assessment of the authorities’ failures rather pointed a lack of preparation, coordination and initiative, without mentioning race and poverty as determining factors (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 2006).

The social vulnerabilities of those who did not evacuate
The reasons why these people did not evacuate are multiple and intertwined. A survey conducted by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University amongst evacuees in Houston identifies the main factors that impacted upon the migration decision of those who stayed behind ("Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees"  2005):

	55 pc of the respondents indicated that a reason for their not leaving was they didn’t own a car or had no way to leave, and 36 pc indicated that this reason was the main reason why they did not leave. It is useful to mention here that roughly one quarter of the New Orleans population did not have a car, a situation highly unusual in American cities. Furthermore, internal mobility was more limited in New Orleans than in other American cities: 77.4 pc of the people living in New Orleans were born in the city, and had lived there most of their lives (Fussell 2006), and some had never been out of the State of Louisiana or even the city. Some of the respondents I met did not evacuate because they just didn’t know where to go. 
	Another prominent reason that prevented some to evacuate the city  was the idea that the storm wouldn’t be as big as it was. 64 pc of the people surveyed mentioned it a reason not to leave, and it was the primary reason for 29 pc of them. This might sound surprising given the numerous warnings and intense media coverage of the hurricane. However, as stated above in the first section, one must keep in mind that New Orleans was usually on the path of hurricanes, and evacuations were almost an annual routine, resulting in a ‘cry wolf’ effect. As expressed by one interviewee:
“I didn’t want to evacuate, I thought it would be like every year, a lot of hassle, and the traffic jams, all for nothing… My children finally convinced that I had to evacuate, and thy came to pick me up at 5 in the morning. I had only packed a few things, because I thought we’d be back the day after, as always.”
	Some were also unable to leave (22 pc of those surveyed), or had to care for someone who was unable to leave (23 pc of the respondents). Whichever of these two reasons represented the main reason for not leaving for 14 pc of all respondents. Evacuation procedures lacked provisions for those who were ill or disabled. At a conference on the evacuation of the carless population, many participants pointed out the need for the city to compile a database of all its disabled residents, in order to be able to organise their evacuation preventively in case of a new hurricane alert. A twenty-something girl I interviewed told how she had decided to ride the storm in her home at Kenner​[3]​ because she refused to leave behind her old neighbour, who was unable to evacuate and apparently not being taken care of by the authorities. The situation in hospitals was very difficult: about 250 residents were stranded in the city’s Memorial Hospital, among which 34 eventually died as a result of Katrina (Curiel 2006: 2067). Some medical personnel chose to administer some patients with lethal doses of morphine, knowing they wouldn’t or couldn’t be rescued, or that their medical condition wouldn’t sustain an evacuation procedure. Their trail was widely discussed and meditated, and serves as a perfect illustration of the disarray in which medial personnel were left.
	Other reasons included a too long wait (42 pc), a worry that the house would be burgled or possessions stolen (27 pc), a refusal to abandon the pets (9 pc), or simply a refusal to leave (37 pc)​[4]​. Pets were not allowed in shelters, and some residents refused to leave them behind. An interviewee explained that she didn’t want to leave her dog behind, and she knew the dog wouldn’t be allowed in shelters. When she saw the water rising in her house, she decided to borrow her neighbours’ canoe, and canoed until the French Quarter, since she had heard on the news that this part of the city was not flooded. She then roamed into an unoccupied friend’s house, and stayed there for a few days. Another interviewee didn’t want to leave his French Quarter house unoccupied, so he bought himself a gun, and rode out the storm in his house. 
Such a survey, however, fails to capture other reasons that account for explaining why some segments of the population did not evacuate. Laska and Hearn-Morrow have shown how social vulnerabilities were concentrated in New Orleans (2006: 10): these factors included poverty, race, lack of personal vehicle, and rented housing. Evacuation required money for food, gas and lodging, and many poor families were unable to afford the expense. Furthermore, the hurricane struck at the end of the month: many of the poorest residents were awaiting the paycheck, leaving even less resources available for their evacuation (Fussell 2006).

John Beggs, professor of sociology at Louisiana State University, further insists on the role played by the social environment in explaining evacuation patterns​[5]​. He points out that the individuals who are most isolated are less likely to leave, since “isolation is crippling their mobility”. This observation was confirmed by many interviewees, particularly amongst elderly people. Many of them, unwilling to leave, were convinced to do so by their children, grandchildren or friends. Previous studies have shown a strong correlation between age and evacuation decision (Gladwin and Peacock 1997), and this correlation could clearly be observed here.

In that regard, it should also be noted that those who had friends or relatives living outside New Orleans were more likely to evacuate: ‘evacuees of all income levels prefer to stay with family or friends; thus having kin or social networks outside the threatened area, but not too far; is an important factor encouraging evacuation’ (Laska and Hearn Morrow 2006: 10). Those without social networks were the last to evacuate (Fussell 2006).

Finally, the role of information shouldn’t be downplayed. Several publications have already pointed out the importance of the access of meteorological information in order to minimise the damage sustained (Watkins 2007). In the case of Katrina, despite the wide media coverage before the hurricane made landfall, only 73 pc of the respondents to the above-mentioned survey were aware of the evacuation order before the hurricane hit ("Survey of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees"  2005). Amongst those who heard the evacuation order (mostly through television and/or radio), 32 pc asserted that the evacuation order did not give clear information about how to evacuate, and only 38 pc eventually chose to do so. 

Overall, many factors influenced the decision and ability to evacuate, and these factors often combined. Though most of the evacuation was rather successful, and carried out before the hurricane made landfall, a fraction of the New Orleans population remained trapped in the city. Those trapped in the city were mostly black, poor, renters, carless. These social vulnerabilities cumulated and resulted in environmental vulnerabilities, which was directly dependent upon socio-economic factors. Laska and Hearn-Morrow correctly observe that ‘evacuation decisions were shaped by income, age, gender, access to information and transportation, health and physical mobility, occupations, and social networks’ (2006: 11). Those who couldn’t evacuate on time were failed down by authorities not only before the hurricane it, but also in its aftermath, and concentrated most of the media coverage. This is what I shall discuss in the next section.
HOW THE MEDIA SHAPED THE CATASTROPHE
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, media were highly praised for their role in assisting the recovery efforts. Local radio station WWL, an affiliate of CBS, took phone calls from people trapped in their house and helped rescuers locate them. Local newspaper Times-Picayune did not miss a single day of the crisis, despite its offices being flooded. The whole staff relocated in the Communication Department of LSU at Baton Rouge, and the paper continued to be edited on the internet. CNN dispatched its reporter Anderson Cooper to New Orleans very early after the flood, and played an instrumental role in alerting the general public about the drama that was unfolding in New Orleans. In absence of any local or state officials, the media were the only link between the trapped residents and the external world. I shall first discuss the role played by the media in shaping the catastrophe, then discuss how the refugee controversy developed.
An image for the victims
Given their role in the aftermath of the disaster, it is not surprising that the media played a central role in shaping the language characterizing the disaster and its victims. Many studies have shown the process and mechanisms that lead to this characterization  ADDIN EN.CITE (Hopkins 2007b; Sommers et al. 2006; Tierney et al. 2006). Most reporting was done with the people who had not evacuated New Orleans or had  relocated in Houston, and less attention was given to those who had fled earlier and relocated elsewhere. Soon the image of Katrina’s victims became black and poor, as clumsily expressed by Wolf Blitzer on CNN: ‘You simply get chills every time you see those poor individuals… so many of these people, almost all of them that we see, are so poor, and they’re so black’ (Brinkley 2006: 204). 

Through this characterization, media also constructed social perceptions, sometimes different from the perception of the victims themselves: the National Guards were often pictured hugging babies or rescuing people, but they were perceived as ominous by the very people they were supposed to help. 

Soon the focus shifted from the levees and the floods to the social unrest, looting and shooting that were supposed to take place in the city. The lack of food supplies in New Orleans strongly contrasted with the fully-stocked shelves of stores and supermarkets, which had all been locked down. Soon enough, stranded residents broke into the stores, looking for food and supplies. These actions were often described by the media as ‘looting’ leading to a ‘criminalisation of New Orleanians in Katrina’s wake’ (Kaufman 2006). Overall, it was widely acknowledged that these reports were grossly exaggerated and over-dramatized. I argue that this view also allowed for the shift that was observed in the Texan media, where evacuees were described as victims in the first days following the evacuation, then increasingly as trouble-makers and even thugs and criminals as time went on. Furthermore, Hopkins showed that these reports had impacted negatively on the public perception towards the poor and the black (Hopkins 2007a), while Tierney, Bevc and Kuligowski brilliantly showed the linkages between these perceptions and the handling of the crisis by the authorities (Tierney et al. 2006). According to them, a common myth about disasters link these to social unrest, violence and looting. They argue that ‘the media’s relentless adherence to disaster myths and to frames emphasizing civil unrest and urban insurgency, along with the strategic response measures these reports justified, had a number of immediate negative consequences’ (2006: 77) . The most obvious of these negative consequences was the sending of military personnel in New Orleans, with the mission of enforcing law and order, rather than bringing food and supplies. Tierney and her colleagues argue that the conjunction of media reports and disaster myths on social unrest reinforces the political discourse for the greater involvement of the military in disaster management, as well as militarism as an ideology in the United States. As said above, the presence of the military in New Orleans, and their focus on law and order, generated much criticism.

Overall, the media constructed an image for the victims of the hurricane: focusing on those who had not evacuated, they portrayed them as black and poor, and therefore stressed the social vulnerabilities and inequalities that were suddenly exposed by Katrina, though they had existed for a very long time before the storm hit. Furthermore, the media insisted heavily on the looting and social unrest, and conveyed an image of the victims as vandals and trouble-makers. Doing so, they reinforced a distorted racial framework where blackness and poverty had long been pathologised (Dyson 2006). If the victims had no capacity to act against the images and public perceptions that were constructed, they revolted against the name they had been given: refugees.

A name for the victims, or the refugee controversy
In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, the word most commonly used to describe the victims was ‘refugees’ (Sommers et al. 2006: 40), but the term was unanimously rebutted by the victims themselves, who insisted on being called ‘evacuees’ or ‘survivors’. Amongst the persons, I interviewed, only one agreed on being called a refugee. Interestingly, she had been a  refugee before, fleeing France during the Second World War to settle in Louisiana with her husband. ‘I felt I was reliving my life again’, she explained, ‘that was exactly the same experience. I don’t see what’s wrong with “refugees”, that’s exactly what it was.’ All others insisted they were not refugees, with the most common rationale for this rebuttal being that ‘refugee’ implied they were foreigners in their own country. ‘We were transplants, not refugees’, explained one evacuee, ‘refugees are from foreign countries’. Refusing the ‘refugee’ label was also a way, for many, to stress the duties and obligations of their country towards them. Former New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial offered the wording ‘citizen refugees’, without success (Gordon 2005), and President Bush also weighed in the controversy, stating during a meeting with representatives of voluntary organization on 6 September 2005: 

You know, there's a debate here about refugees. Let me tell you my attitude and the attitude of people around this table: The people we're talking about are not refugees. They are Americans, and they need the help and love and compassion of our fellow citizens. (White House Press Secretary Office 2005)

Shortly after the controversy erupted, many news media stopped using the word and replaced it with others, most often ‘evacuees’. Mark Schleifstein, of The Times-Picayune, explained that he received a memo from his editor asking reporters to no longer use the word​[6]​. Lolis Ellie, another reporter for the same newspaper, told me that he also stopped using it, just ‘because it obviously hurt people’s feelings’, but he felt there was no other adequate word to describe the plight of the evacuees. ‘In my view, “evacuee” is not strong enough; these people had lost everything and were looking for a refuge, but I didn’t want to add more suffering to their life’​[7]​. Other news media, on the other hand, kept on using the word, most notably CNN, The New York Times and The Associated Press. On 7 September 2005, Lou Dobbs made the case for the continuous use of the term ‘refugee’ on CNN:

You've heard on this broadcast, by the way, several people, including Reverend Jesse Jackson and others admonish us not to use the term refugee when describing the New Orleans citizen who have had to flee their homes. Jackson and others including President Bush have said or implied that term is racially insensitive. In my opinion, straightforwardly, Reverend Jackson and President Bush are not entirely correct. The Miriam Webster Dictionary defines refugee as one who flees. (…) The president, Jackson and others apparently think that news organizations created the term refugee just to describe victims of Hurricane Katrina. Hardly. Even a cursory review of reporting of such disaster of Hurricane Andrew, the 1993 midwestern floods and wildfires through the west have all prompted the use of the term refugee by news organizations. I'm proud to tell you that this network has resisted others telling them how to use words. Rejecting, in fact, the United Nations suggestion that we use, instead of refugee, the expression internally displaced persons. I love that one. We’ll continue here to use the term on this broadcast where we think it is most descriptive. (Dobbs 2005)

Other reasons were also put forward to dismiss the term ‘refugee’: it was argued that the term stripped people off their dignity (Masquelier 2006)​[8]​, while others, such as Reverends Jackson and Sharpton, contended that the term was racially biased. Linguist Geoffrey Nunberg, in a study posted on his personal website, observed that the term had been used before, to describe the people fleeing the Dust Bowl – another case labelled ‘environmental migration’ – and also that the word ‘refugee’ was twice more likely to be used than ‘evacuee’ when the word appeared within ten words of the words ‘black’ or ‘poor’ (Nunberg 2005). This led him to the conclusion that ‘those disparities no doubt reflect the image of refugees as poor, bedraggled, and forlorn, and they suggest that there's a genuine basis for the impression that the word tends to single out one group, even if unwittingly’.

As Masquelier points it, the unease about the word ‘refugee’  in New Orleans points toward a categorical void:

The word (…) was unsuitable to describe the plight of people who had been (…) forced to evacuate their homes prior to or in the days following the storm: they had left their homes, not their country. And yet (…) there appeared to be no adequate substitute that would convey with enough intensity the nightmarish experience so many New Orleanians had gone through in the wake of Katrina and the dire predicament survivors (…) faced as they prepared to start life anew away from the ravaged Gulf Coast. (2006: 135)

Masquelier further argues that this categorical void reveals a social void in which poor New Orleanians had been confined for years: could this claim be transposed to environmental migrants in general, often misnamed and lacking a proper terminology?

CONCLUSION: WHAT’S IN A NAME? SEMANTICS AND VULNERABILITIES
The failure of the authorities in the aftermath of the disaster were not confined to emergency relief: they revealed a much larger social failure of the social system, and exposed vulnerabilities to a country that had long been blind about them. In many ways, Katrina was a social disaster of unprecedented amplitude. In that regard, the word ‘refugee’ was more than just a name, but a summary of these vulnerabilities. In many ways however, those stranded in the city experienced a refugee-like situation of stress, trauma and despair; for many of them, the place where they had been relocated was indeed another country. Though the word ‘refugee’ was widely used by the media to describe all people displaced by the hurricane, the images used always focused on the poor, black residents stranded in the city, and soon the word ‘refugee’ equalled ‘black’ and ‘poor’, as if those who had evacuated before the hurricane belonged to another category: the ‘evacuees’.

The reason why those called ‘refugees’ had been stranded in the city was directly dependent upon their social vulnerabilities, as I have tried to show in the first section of this paper. I argue that the reason why they rebutted the R-word was that it was perceived as a stigma for these vulnerabilities. Masquelier rightly asserts that ‘our failure to find a word that would describe appropriately the dire circumstances of so many Katrina victims without further victimizing them hints at a much larger failure, one that resulted over the years in the virtual disenfranchisement of a whole stratum of the U.S. population’ (2006: 741). The lack of adequate vocabulary also reveals the lack of visibility of the vulnerabilities, the lack of a conceptual machinery to acknowledge and address them – I contend that this is a major explanation of the failures of the evacuation and relief efforts. 

In the context of Katrina, two readings of the rebuttal of the word ‘refugee’ can be made: a refusal to be considered as ‘second-class’ citizens, or foreigners in their own country, but also a refusal to admit that New Orleans residents had been failed and abandoned by their own government. This dual reading reflects a double estrangement. The first one conveys the idea that the refugee label confiscated the identity and citizenship of those it designated, and confined them in a state of displacement whereas their only wish was to return to New Orleans as soon as possible. The second reading emphasizes the obligations of the state towards its citizens, and conveys the anger at the lack of response by he authorities. Many interviewees insisted that their government had a duty to care about them, and refused the idea of a ‘failing state that could just abandon them and let them become refugees indeed. 

Furthermore, this controversy also has implications for the current academic and political debates on the definition and typology of environmental migration, as it reminds us how much categorizations matter, even in the most dramatic circumstances. These categorizations shape the identity of the victims, and thus one can assume that they also affect their ability to cope with the disaster. Until now, the academic community has widely considered the term ‘refugee’, when dealing with environmental migration, as a misnomer for legal reasons: people displaced by environmental changes are not recognised as refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention. The controversy that erupted in the wake of Katrina invites us to reconsider the role of language and words in shaping the perception of the victims of disasters, and the impact of categories on the people they are supposed to classify. In any case, it certainly shows that ‘refugee’ might not be a misnomer for legal reasons only. 
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^1	  Louisiana State University
^2	  The I-10 is the principal exit route out of New Orleans, and connects the city to Baton Rouge, and further to Texas.
^3	  A suburb of New Orleans, where the international airport is located.
^4	  Multiple answers were allowed.
^5	  Interview with the author, Baton Rouge, March 2007.
^6	  Interview with the author, New Orleans, February 2007.
^7	  Ibidem.
^8	  Interestingly, after the 1999 floods in Venezuela, President Chavez suggested to call the victims dignificados, instead of damnificados.
